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The End of the Urban-Rural Divide? 
Emerging Quasi-Commons in Rural China
ABSTRACT: The urban-rural divide in China was an entrenched feature of Chinese society 
in the Maoist era. This divide generated and continues to generate inequality as between 
the rural population and the urban population. In post-Deng China, legal and administrative 
distinctions between urban and rural have become blurred, especially with the development 
of rural-urban migration. Nevertheless, the urban-rural divide still exists, and the income of 
farmers is below that of urban residents. In this paper, it is argued that the emergence of 
the phenomenon of “quasi-commons” in rural China, crossing the “borders” of the urban-
rural divide, may increase farmers’ income in the future and bridge this divide. The paper 
focuses on different forms of “quasi-commons” (the sharing and use of communal land) 
emerging in rural areas, including the farmland shareholding cooperatives and transforming 
rural land management rights into shares in joint ventures. There are divergent views held 
by Chinese academics and policy makers about “quasi-commons” in rural China, as well as 
the direction of change in the rural land system. However, most of the proposals for reform 
have been polarized between nationalization and privatization of rural land. Looking beyond 
this “boundary thinking” and drawing on the discourses of “the commons” (for example, the 
writings of Hardin, Heller and Ostrom), this paper analyses the theoretical models of both 
the nationalization and privatization schemes and their shortcomings. The present essay 
also analyses the prospect for, and the barriers to the emerging commons in rural China. 
1. Introduction: defi nitions, discourses and approaches
The urban-rural divide (chengxiang eryuan hua ?????) in China became en-
trenched in the Maoist era. This divide generated and continues to generate inequality 
between the rural population and the urban population: in particular, farmers have been 
tied tightly to the countryside. In post-Mao, and especially in the post-Deng period, 
legal and administrative distinctions between urban and rural are becoming blurred.1 
The government now has made many efforts to bridge the urban-rural divide. For ex-
ample, according to the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC, the ministry in charge 
of operating the household registration system (huji zhidu ????), 13 provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities have abolished the category of rural house-
hold (nongye hukou ????).2 Yet the urban-rural divide still exists, and there exists 
a large gap between cities and the countryside in many respects, including social se-
curity, infrastructure investment, education, and health care. Rather than focusing on 
the household registration system and rural-to-urban migration, as most literature has 
done, this paper looks at the rural land system and related governance issues, which 
have a fundamental impact on the urban-rural divide. 
1 Decollectivization in 1978 loosened the control over the rural population on leaving the countryside, 
and urbanization and rural industrialization make the urban-rural boundaries blurred. The blurred 
boundaries are demonstrated in, e. g., rural-urban migration. 
2 See Gong Zhiyan, Gong’an bu cheng shisan sheng shi qu quxiao nongye hukou [The Ministry of 
Public Security Announces that 13 Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Municipalities Have Now 
Abolished the Rural Household], in <http://news.sohu.com/20081209/n261100496.shtml> (last 
visited 9 December 2008). 
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Under the urban-rural divide in contemporary China, rural land is collectively owned, 
and farmers may not in law dispose of their land freely and are vulnerable to compulsory 
land acquisition by the state. In the process of urbanization and industrialization, rural 
land is generating signifi cant profi ts; however, local governments, offi cials, and property 
developers profi t the most, while farmers are often excluded and sometimes exploited. 
Nevertheless, “quasi-commons” are emerging in rural China, including the setting up 
of farmland shareholding cooperatives and transforming rural land management rights 
into shares in joint venture. The focus of this paper is to explore the emerging “quasi-
commons” in the transforming rural land system and how it could possibly bridge the 
urban-rural divide. 
It may be useful to contextualize my central concerns by looking briefl y at the cur-
rent property system in China and its transformation. The legal reforms in the late Qing 
dynasty (1840–1911) and Republican China (1911–1949) introduced many aspects 
of the Civil Law system to China from Germany, via Japan. The Civil Code formulated 
by the Guomindang in 1929–1931 was based on the German law framework, which 
recognizes private ownership, but this code was abolished in 1949. Between 1949 
and 1978, the means of production in the Chinese central planned economy was 
based on the former Soviet model, that is, public ownership (including state and col-
lective ownership),3 while private ownership was virtually abandoned.4 In the Mao era 
(1949–1978), the conception of ownership in China was overwhelmingly infl uenced 
by former Soviet jurisprudence. Ownership was regarded as indivisible and absolute. 
Public and collective interests were superior to individual interests; acquisition and 
management of property was under an overarching administrative fi at.5 Although civil 
law-making in the post-1978 era returned to the German Civil Law framework, a clear 
boundary between public ownership and private ownership still existed in the law, and 
a tri-ownership system including state ownership, collective ownership and private 
ownership has evolved and persisted. Yet in contrast to the relatively neat distinction 
between public and private ownership defi ned in law, the forms of property in post-Mao 
China in reality are not so clear-cut. Absolute ownership has been fragmented into the 
“contractual management rights” (chengbao jingying quan ?????) of collectively 
owned rural land, the “enterprise management rights” (qiye jingying quan ?????) 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the “land use rights” (LURs) (tudi shiyong quan ?
????) of state-owned urban land and so on. 
There is also a need to review briefl y the discourses of “commons” and to defi ne 
the term “quasi-commons” as used in this paper. The conception of “commons” is fl uid 
3 The Constitution (2004), Article 10: “Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives ex-
cept for those portions which belong to the state in accordance with the law; house sites and private 
plots of cropland and hilly land are also owned by collectives”. Article 9 of the Land Administration 
Law (2004) defi nes collective ownership in the same way as Article 10 of the Constitution. 
4 Private ownership was not formally abolished in 1949, and a mixed economy was adopted between 
1949 and 1956 as a prelude to nationalization of private capital. Whether nor not a complete system 
of public ownership was established is unclear. E. g., Article 11 of the 1954 Constitution recognized 
private property: “the State protects the right of citizens to own lawfully-earned incomes, savings, 
houses and other means of life”. Article 12 of the 1954 Constitution provides: “the State protects 
the right of citizens to inherit private property according to law”. See the English version of the 1954 
Constitution, in: Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China, ed. Albert P. Blaustein, 1962. 
The content of Article 11 of the 1954 Constitution was restated in Article 9 of the 1975 Constitution, 
but “the right to inherit private property” was abandoned in the 1975 Constitution. 
5 See Pitman Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of Glo-
balized Norms and Practices, Washington University Global Studies Law Review 2(2003), no. 119, 
126–127. 
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in the Western literature, and it absorbs many theoretical premises. Traditionally, the 
commons is associated with natural resources, but new kinds of commons are also 
emerging.6 Dietz defi nes “commons” as “a diversity of resources or facilities as well as 
property institutions that involve some aspects of joint owners or access”.7 The com-
mons encapsulates “the emerging conception of access, conservation, and use…[as 
well as] many different grassroots movements”.8 
There are many debates over the commons. The seminal essay in this fi eld is Har-
din’s The Tragedy of the Commons: the commons is traditionally associated with plots 
of land, and overexploitation of the commons by free-riders gives rise to the tragedy.9 
The commons also links to the question of the manner in which a resource can best 
be managed. For example, Hardin shows that the commons as an unregulated free 
set of resources open to use by all cannot exist, and “freedom in a commons brings 
ruin to all”.10 In response to Hardin’s arguments, the concept of anticommons emerged 
to describe the post-communist ordering of property in Eastern Europe, especially 
Moscow. Heller defi nes “anticommon property” as “a property regime in which multi-
ple owners hold effective rights to exclusion in a scarce resource”.11 Enclosure is not 
always desirable. According to Heller, rational individuals collectively waste a scarce 
resource, and the “tragedy of the anticommons” has emerged because there are too 
many owners or too much ownership. 
In addition, “commons”, “common-pool resources”, “common property”, and “public 
good” are closely linked and often used interchangeably. However, there is a need to 
distinguish these related concepts. For example, a key challenge to Hardin’s model is 
that “Hardin had seriously confused the concept of common property with open access 
conditions where no rules existed to limit entry and use”.12 “Common-pool resource” 
usually refers to “a natural or man-made resource system that is suffi ciently large as 
to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential benefi ciaries from obtaining 
benefi ts from its use”.13 “A public good” is “something to which everyone has access, 
but… one person’s use of the resource does not necessarily diminish the potential 
for use by another”.14 The term “common property” implies “a kind of management 
arrangement created by humans rather than a characteristic of the resource itself”,15 
and it is “not everyone’s property”.16 
The relevance of “the commons” to the Chinese context needs to be explored: 
“the commons” provides an approach to the question of property in China, and looks 
beyond the dichotomy of private property versus public property.17 In this paper, I use 
 6 See, e. g., Jane B. Holder and Tatiana Flessas, Emerging Commons, Legal and Social Studies 
17(2008), no. 3, 299–310. 
 7 Thomas Dietz [et al], The Drama of the Commons, in: The Drama of the Commons, ed. Elinor Ostrom 
[et al], 2002, 18
 8 Holder and Flessas (note 6), 300 
 9 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162 (1968), no. 3859, 1243–1248 
10 Ibid, 1244
11 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, Harvard Law Review 11(1998), no. 3, 668. Italics are in the original. 
12 Dietz (note 7), 11. Italics are in the original. 
13 See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 1990, 30. 
14 See Dietz (note 7), 4–5. 
15 ibid, 17
16 S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup and R. C. Bishop, Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy, 
Natural Resources Journal 15(1975), no. 4, 715 
17 On the works of “the commons” in the Chinese context, see, e. g., ed. Eduard B Vermeer [et al], Co-
operative and Collective in China’s Rural Development: Between State and Private Interests, 1998, 
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the term “quasi-commons” to refer to the sharing and use of collective land jointly by 
farmers (usually within one “natural village” or one administrative village)18 in rural 
China. “Quasi-commons” draws upon three important aspects of the conception of “the 
commons”: resources held in a communal manner, governance of such resources, and 
grassroots initiatives.19 “Quasi-commons” also stresses “conservation” and “access” as 
emphasized in the commons discourses. The use of the term “quasi” highlights that, 
although “commons” in rural China resembles some aspects of the commons in the 
Western literature, there are many aspects that differ from the Western context. Com-
munal use and governance of rural land in China are based on Chinese socio-economic 
conditions, as well as affected by legal and political institutions. For instance, there has 
been much local government involvement in “quasi-commons”. Thus, the distinctions 
between “communal”, “cooperative”, and “collective” could be blurred. “Quasi-commons” 
could be either “collectives” (referred to herein as government-directed property ar-
rangements in rural China) or “cooperatives” (referred to herein as voluntarily formed 
property arrangements in rural China).20 But the distinction between “collectives” and 
“cooperatives” is not clear-cut; cooperatives could also be absorbed and co-opted by 
the state. Quasi-commons are also different from collective ownership, which is mainly 
a fabrication of Chinese law and politics.21 Looking beyond the boundary of the no-
tion of private property versus public property/common property, this paper analyses 
“quasi-commons” in historical and contemporary rural China; the relations between 
“quasi-commons” and the urban-rural divide; and the barriers to, and the prospects 
for, “quasi-commons” in transforming China. 
2. “Small community” and rural-urban uniformity in historical context
In traditional China no clear legal and administrative distinction was clearly drawn be-
tween cities and the countryside, even though symbolically or spatially the super status 
of the cities might be marked by surrounding city walls.22 But throughout Chinese his-
tory there have been tensions between the large community (da gongtongti ????) 
and the small community (xiao gongtongti ????):23 kinship as the most powerful 
especially Margaret McKean, The Role of Common Property Regime in Managing Common-Pool 
Resources in China Today, 75–92 in this book; Peter Ho, Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, 
Property Rights and Social Confl ict in China, 2005, especially Between Nationalization and Privatiza-
tion: Common Property as the Third Way? 157–185 in this book; Richard Sanders, Organic Agriculture 
in China: Do Property Rights Matter?, Journal of Contemporary China 15(2006), no. 46, 113–132. 
18 “Natural Villages” emphasizes villages “in the sense of what is local and long-standing”, while “admin-
istrative villages” refers to “the collective” or “sub-government institutions”. See Stephan Feuchtwang, 
What is Village? in: ed. Vermeer [et al] (note 17), 47. 
19 In this sense, “the commons” and “common property” are used interchangeably in this paper. 
20 On the distinction between collectives and cooperatives, see also McKean (note 17), 82. 
21 Some scholars emphasize the importance of collective ownership to agricultural modernization 
and rural development, but they do not distinguish collective ownership from “commons” or “quasi-
commons”. See, e. g., Qian Forrest Zhang and John A. Donaldson, The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism 
with Chinese Characteristics: Agricultural Modernization, Agribusiness and Collective Land Rights, 
The China Journal (2008), no. 60, 25–47. 
22 On rural-urban uniformity in traditional China see, e. g., F. W. Mote, The Transformation of Nanking, 
1350–1400, in: The City in Late Imperial China, ed. G. William Skinner, 1977, 101–154. 
23 These two concepts are proposed by Professor Qin Hui of Tsinghua University. “Large community” 
refers to centralization of government, and “small community” refers to self-governing organizations, 
e. g., kinship and grassroots associations. Qin Hui’s analytical model is derived from the writing of 
Ferdinand Tönnies – Community and Civil Society. See Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil So-
561The End of the Urban-Rural Divide?
small community might produce “self-governance” and “the commons”, but the central 
government tended to break such communities down and diminish their autonomy. 
Since the early Zhou (1046 BC–256 BC) dynasty, the idea that “under Heaven there 
should be only one ruler” has been a dominant theme.24 
The reform of the Qin political system in the year 356 BC, known as the reform of 
Shang Yang25 (shangyang bianfa ????), was a signifi cant step towards the cen-
tralization of the Qin. During the reform of Shang Yang, the population was divided into 
units and registered in the household system – wu (?) composed of fi ve households, 
and shi (?) composed of ten households. The wrongdoing of one household could 
make another nine households incur group responsibility. These measures of dividing 
the population into small units for control purposes laid down the legacy for the bao jia 
(??) system,26 which continued to be used in imperial times and even into Republi-
can China. Moreover, from the Qin unifi cation (221BC) onwards, individual households 
were transformed into the category of “common people listed in the household register” 
(bian hu qi min ????),27 subject to the direct control of the central government. The 
centralized government, an emblem of the large community, constrained the autonomy 
of small communities and individuals. 
Yet, as Francis Fukuyama argues, “strong community can emerge in the absence of 
a strong state”,28 Kinship could gain room to develop in the areas where the control of 
the central government was weak. For example, kinship was vulnerable in the North but 
strong in areas of South China such as the Pearl River Delta.29 Although lineage-based 
communities were exclusive, they also linked together and formed a larger community.30 
Lineages performed a number of economic functions and played important roles in 
rural governance. For instance, lineages managed lineage land, and raised funds for 
famine relief, social welfare and education. They also played important roles in dispute 
resolution within the lineage.31 No absolute and exclusive “private” property existed 
in traditional China; the private usually referred to kinship not the individual, and the 
distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere was also blurred. Many 
lineages held commonly owned lineage properties (zuchan ??). In practice, half or 
more of the land in a village was tied up in indivisible lineage estates.32 Lineage-based 
ciety, trans. José Harris and Margaret Hollis, 2001. Tönnies focuses on a contrast linked to a theory 
of modernization between small-scale, kinship and neighborhood-based “communities” and large-
scale competitive market “societies”. See Qin Hui, Ping Tengnisi “gongtongti yu shehui” [Comments 
on Tönnies’ “Community and Civil Society”], Shuwu (2000), no.2, 57–58. 
24 Derk Bodde, The State and Empire of Ch’in, in: The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 1, the Ch’in and 
Han Empires, 221 B. C.–A. D. 220, ed. Denis Twichett and Michael Loewe, 1986, 38 
25 Shang Yang was the leader and designer of the reform. On the reform of Shangyang, see also Zhang 
Jinfan, Zhang Xipo and Zeng Xianyi, Zhongguo fazhi shi [The Legal History of China], 1981, 88–90. 
26 Ten family households were organized into a bao (?), and 10 bao made up a jia (?). 
27 See Du Zhengsheng, Bian Hu Qi Min: Chuantong zhengzhi shehui jiegou zhi xingcheng [Common 
People Listed in the Household Register: the Formation of the Traditional Political Society], 1990. 
28 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, 1995, 29 
29 In Chinese history, North China was under stronger control by the central government. 
30 Helen F. Siu, Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural Revolution, 1989, 5 
31 On the literature on lineage organization in Southeast China, see, e. g., Maurice Freedman, Chinese 
Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwantung, 1966; James Watson, Hereditary Tenancy and Corpo-
rate Landlordism in Traditional China, Modern Asian Studies 11 (1977), 161–182; James Watson, 
Chinese Kinship Reconsidered: Anthropological Perspectives on Historical Research, The China 
Quarterly (1982), no. 92, 589–672. 
32 See Rubie S. Watson, Corporate Property and Local Leadership in the Pearl River Delta, 1898–1941, 
in: Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance, ed. Joseph W. Esherick and Mary Backus 
Rankin, 1990, 241. 
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communities were important not only in the economic sense but also in the political 
sense. There were often interactions and tensions between lineages and the central 
government. 
3. Against “commons”: Collectivization and the urban-rural divide
The land reform (tugai ??) was the major project launched by the CCP in rural areas 
during the period 1949–1952 after the founding of the PRC in 1949:33 land and other 
property of landlords (including corporate landlords such as lineages, temples, and 
monasteries) was confi scated and redistributed so that each household in a rural vil-
lage would have a comparable land holding. Property rights encoded in the land reform 
established complete private ownership of farmers. Land could also be freely transferred 
in the market. Private ownership of land therefore stimulated farmers’ enthusiasm for 
agricultural production. 
Yet farming needed cooperatives and cooperative working. Farmers later voluntarily 
formed mutual aid teams (huzhu zu ???), based on arrangements among several 
households for sharing labor and means of production. In this kind of property ar-
rangement, private ownership and common property were not mutually exclusive but 
existed side-by-side. However, this kind of “commons” did not last long. In 1953, the 
CCP initiated its fi rst Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), and “socialist transformation” (shehui 
zhuyi gaizao ??????) and “industrialization” (gongyehua ???) became the 
key programs and were strongly modeled on the Soviet Union. Later still mutual aid 
teams were transformed into primary cooperatives (chuji she ???) in autumn 1954,34 
which were based on apportioning of agricultural income from the amount of land that 
the household owned and on the labor input of that household. During this period, land 
ownership still belonged to farmers, but use rights were held by primary cooperatives: 
rural land was “privately owned and publicly run” (siyou gongying ????). Income 
distribution was still according to the quantity and quality of farmers’ land. In spring 1956, 
primary cooperatives were updated to “advanced cooperatives” (gaoji she ???), the 
formation of which was beyond the boundaries of “natural” villages (ziran cun ???). In 
rural areas during this period, farmers joined advanced cooperatives by handing in their 
assets, including land and also large production materials that had been distributed to 
them in the previous land reform. After being incorporated into advanced cooperatives, 
farmers could only keep a few “private plots” (ziliu di ???) to grow subsidiary food 
such as vegetables and fruits, as well as residential plots (zhaiji di ???) on which 
farmers’ houses were built. Except for these private plots and residential plots, both 
land ownership and use rights belonged to advanced cooperatives, and rural land was 
publicly-owned and publicly-run (gongyou gongying ????). Farmers were no longer 
permitted to be landowners, or even land users, but were transformed into members of 
cooperatives, that is, employees of “advanced cooperatives”. Income distribution was 
implemented through a system of work points (gongfen ??) – according to the socialist 
principle, income is based on the work done by each person. 
Based on primary and advanced production cooperatives, people’s communes 
(renmin gongshe ????) were formed in 1958. This led to the formation of a col-
33 The early land reform was launched by the CCP in 1946 in some liberated areas (jiefangqu ???), 
three years before the foundation of the PRC; thorough land reform was conducted after the promul-
gation of the “Law of Land Reform of the People’s Republic of China” in 1950. 
34 The exact time varied depending on different localities. 
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lectively owned land system. There are differences between people’s communes and 
advanced cooperatives. For example, a farmer could withdraw from advanced coop-
eratives, take away his or her properties and get remuneration for his or her work in 
the cooperatives. After the formation of people’s communes in 1958, however, farmers 
were deprived of such “withdrawal rights”. Public ownership replaced farmer’s private 
ownership over land.35 Both rural land ownership and land use rights were collectivized. 
In terms of residential plots, “The Working Regulation of the People’s Communes”36 
promulgated in 1961 provided that residential plots should be owned by production 
teams, and lease and transfer of residential plots were forbidden; houses built on resi-
dential plots belonged to farmers, and these houses were subject to lease and sale.37 
Property rights of residential plots and of farmers’ houses were separated. In 1962, 
rural landownership was formally transformed into three-level agricultural collectives 
each headed by a branch of the Party: production teams (shengchan xiaodui ???
?), production brigades (shengchan dadui ????) and people’s communes. 
Based on collective ownership, production and consumption were put under highly 
centralized and extended state-party control. And yet, free riding continued to plague 
the effi ciency of the communes.38 For example, in 1958, communal dining halls (gong-
gong shitang ????) were established in villages, cooking and dining were done in 
the communal kitchens, and free meals were provided for members “to eat as much as 
they wished” no matter how much work they had done. To many farmers at that time, 
free dining meant communism. However, because of waste and over-consumption, 
food was quickly exhausted.39 
Collectivization (1956–1978) was intended to remove landlords40 and governance 
by gentry in rural China, to eliminate private ownership, and to create collective pro-
prietorship by farmers. The doctrine established in the collectivization period was that 
agricultural land should be concentrated into large collective farms in line with Soviet 
doctrine, because such collective farms were thought to provide better conditions for 
modernizing and planning the agricultural sector than small farms. Collectivization in 
China was modeled on post-1917 Soviet collectivization but ignored the differences in 
natural conditions and governance between the countryside in China and in the USSR. 
The big difference was between Russian extensive agriculture and existence of large 
estates and Chinese intensive agriculture and existence of smallholdings. Russian 
farmers in pre-1917 worked in communes (the mir or obshchina) in certain regions of 
Russia;41 whereas Chinese farmers were governed by kinship especially in Southeast 
China. The consequences of eliminating private ownership and gentry governance in 
35 In 1958, even private plots became public property, but private plots were soon restored in 1959. 
36 “Renmin Gongshe gongzuo tiaoli (Xiuzheng Cao’an) ????????(????)”, promulgated on 
15 June 1961. 
37 This provision was further incorporated into the 1982 Constitution, Article 10. 
38 On the “free rider” problem with collective agriculture in China see, e. g., Victor Nee, The Peasant 
Household Economy and Decollectivization in China, Journal of Asian and African Studies 21(1986), 
no. 3/4, 185–203. 
39 See Gene Hsin Chang and Guanzhong James Wen, Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 
1958–1961, Economic Development and Cultural Change 46 (1997), no. 1, 1–34. 
40 “Landlordism” was shorthand for something more complicated. E. g., James L. Watson argues that 
“landlords” were not necessarily individuals; they were landowning “corporations” embedded in 
complex lineages. See James Watson, Hereditary Tenancy and Corporate Landlordism in Traditional 
China: A Case Study, Modern Asian Studies 11 (1977), no. 2, 161–182. 
41 See A False Start: The Birth and Early Activities of the People’s Commissariat of agriculture, 
1917–1920, in: Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State Power and the Transformation of Rural Russia, 
1917–1929, James W. Heinzen, 2004, 11–46. 
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rural China included the state stepping into the empty space left behind by the rural 
gentry. But there were (and still are) so many unavoidable local variations in geography, 
agricultural products and economic activities in China42 that the central government 
was not able to make a comprehensive plan for rural development and direct every 
aspect of such development. 
Collectivization was also accompanied by a substantial decrease in the number 
and scope of markets and the formation of planned purchase and supply.43 Starting in 
late 1953, farmers were subject to a system of unifi ed procurement and sale of grain. 
At that time, the state began creating a grain monopoly, and farmers were required to 
sell their “surplus” grain to the state at fi xed prices.44 The urban-rural divide was es-
tablished during collectivization, and the household registration system was a product 
of the planned economy. In 1956, due to collectivization as noted above and natural 
disasters, the rural population did not have enough grain for its own consumption. Many 
farmers moved into the cities to seek development opportunities. However, the formation 
household registration system prohibited rural-to-urban migration.45 The development 
of the city proceeded at the expense of the countryside. In 1958, the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) passed the “Regulation Concerning Residency Registration”, and the 
household registration system (huji zhidu ????) was formally established. Such 
a system made the gap between the rural and the urban even wider. The abolition of 
private property and assets after 1956 replaced the rich-poor distinction but ironically 
created a new urban-rural disparity.46 
4. Emerging quasi-commons in rural areas in post-Mao China
4.1. The rural land system after decollectivization 
From economic reform commenced in 1978, the communes began to be dismantled, and 
collectivized agriculture was gradually abandoned by the introduction of the “household 
responsibility system”.47 This system was fi rst initiated in 1978 at Fengyang County 
in Anhui Province, and expanded on a nationwide scale between 1980 and 1983:48 
the land of collectives was divided up and assigned to individual households. In terms 
42 E. g., picking tea in mountainous area in Zhejiang Province involves a lot of manual labor, and this 
kind of work cannot just be done by a machine; wheat is grown in Northern China and rice is grown 
in Southern China, and growing rice is more labor intensive. 
43 See Joshua Goldstein, “Introduction”, in: Everyday Modernity in China, ed. Madeleine Yue Dong and 
Joshua L. Goldstein, 2006, 17. 
44 See Vivienne Shue, Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development toward Socialism, 
1949–1956, 1980, 214–226. 
45 See Zhang Wei, Woguo xianxing huji zhidu: xingcheng, yanbian ji tezheng [The Contemporary 
Household Registration System: Formation, Transformation and Characteristics], Lilun Tansuo 
[Theory Exploration] (2006), no. 4, 122. 
46 Dorothy J. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the 
Logic of the Market, 1999, 32 
47 On the transformation of the communes, see, e. g., Vivienne Shue, The Fate of the Commune, Mod-
ern China 10 (1984), no. 3, 259–283. 
48 The third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in 1978 did not recognize the household 
responsibility system. The recognition was given by the Document No. 1 (yihao wenjian ????) 
issued by the CCP Central Committee in Spring 1982. From 1982 and 1986, each year the CCP Cen-
tral Committee published its policies on rural reform and economy in the form of the Document No. 
1. The initial 15-year contractual period was also confi rmed in these fi ve documents. On the Chinese 
Rural Policy in the late 1980s, see, e. g., Flemming Christiansen, Stability First! Chinese Rural Policy 
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of responsibility land (zerentian ???), once their grain quota to the state had been 
fulfi lled, farmers owned and could sell the rest of the grain produced beyond the quota. 
Farmers thus began to pursue economic goals in the re-emerging market. In fact, re-
sponsibility land and residential plots serve as basic social security for farmers. Although 
decollectivization loosened the control over rural migration to the cities, it did not bring 
signifi cant changes to the urban-rural divide. The household responsibility system even 
acts as an obstacle to long-term rural-to-urban migration.49 The village committee may 
re-divide the responsibility land every few years according to the changes in households 
in terms of births, deaths, marriages and migration. Leaving the village for a long time 
may lead to a decrease in responsibility land for that household.50 
Moreover, the dispersed contractual management rights owned by individual house-
holds cannot meet the income and production requirements of farmers in the changing 
economic context. There are now differences between subsistence farming and farming 
for the market, and the latter needs a well-functioning market and cooperative working. 
However, collective ownership defi ned in law is not suffi cient to explain who owns what 
in terms of the production, harvest and distribution of agricultural products. 
Under the Property Law (2007), land use rights (LURs) of collective rural land were 
put into the category of “usufruct” (yongyi wuquan ????), which refers to the right 
to use another’s property. LURs of collective rural land include contractual manage-
ment rights, LURs of rural residential plots, and LURs for construction purposes. Since 
ownership of agricultural collective land is not transferable, leaseable or mortgageable 
per se, alienability of rural land actually refers to the transfer of LURs of rural land, 
which could happen between the state, legal persons and individuals. In terms of 
transferring contractual management rights, according to the 2002 Land Contracting 
Law (tudi chengbaofa ?????),51 contracts can be transferred but cannot be mort-
gaged. A more controversial question is whether or not residential plots and LURs for 
construction can be transferred or sold. According to the law, without approval from the 
government at the county level, farmers cannot assign cultivated land for residential 
purposes, and the LURs for residential purposes cannot be transferred.52 In terms of 
selling LURs for both farming and residential uses, transactions directly with farmers 
are illegal and prohibited by a system of land use certifi cates. Developers must obtain 
land use certifi cates from land administrative bureaux at or above city or county level 
before proceeding with projects.53 The use of agricultural land is unchangeable;54 with-
out approval from the people’s government at or above county level, farmers cannot 
contribute LURs to joint enterprises or joint ventures as investments, or assign LURs 
to township enterprises.55 
Issues 1987–1990, in: From Peasant to Entrepreneur: Growth and Change in Rural China, ed. E. B. 
Vermeer, 1992, 21–40. 
49 See Athar Hussain [et al], PRC: Urban Poverty Strategy II, TA 4694, mimeo, Asian Development 
Bank, 2008, 37. 
50 See also ibid. 
51 Promulgated by the Standing Committee of the NPC on 29 August 2002, implemented on 1 March 
2003
52 Article 62 of the LAL (2004): “Reapplication for a house site by a villager in a rural area who has sold 
or rented out his/her house shall not be approved”. 
53 See Anthony Gar-on Yeh, The Dual Land Market and Urban Development in China, in: Emerging land 
and Housing Markets in China, eds. Ding Chengri and Song Yan, 2005, 40. 
54 The LAL (2004), Article 63 
55 The LAL (2004), Article 60
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4.2. The rural land system under the urban-rural divide 
Land acquisition (tudi zhengshou ????) and requisition of LURs (tudi shiyongquan 
zhengyong ???????) are the only way for farmers’ LURs to enter into the market. 
Both the Chinese Constitution56 and the Land Administration Law (LAL)57 specify that 
the state, in the public interest, may lawfully acquire land owned by collectives. This 
sets the stage for compulsory land acquisition.58 The LAL states that compensation 
shall be given in accordance with the original use of the acquired land,59 and the com-
pensation is through a package that includes compensation for the land, resettlement 
subsidies and compensation for fi xtures (tudi fuzhuowu ?????) to, and young or 
green crops (qingmiao ??) on, the acquired land. Although Article 42 of the Property 
Law (2007) expands the scope of compensation to “the premiums for social security of 
the farmers” in order to guarantee their normal lives and safeguard their lawful rights 
and interests, the compensation is still not specifi ed to be paid at full market prices. 
Furthermore, local governments can acquire rural land from farmers at a low price and 
sell it to property developers at a high price. A great profi t thus could be made because 
of the huge gap between these two different prices.60 
What the “public interest” (gonggong liyi ????) means is very vague in both 
the Constitution and the Property Law. Mansions, golf courses, and lavish government 
buildings are being established in the name of the “public interest” at the expense of 
productive agricultural land. Governments are ill equipped to address the issues that 
have emerged from land acquisition and requisition of LURs because the interests of 
governments are involved in these issues. 
Moreover, because rural land is collectively owned, and what farmers actually hold 
are land use rights, when the state acquires rural land ownership from rural collectives, 
LURs of farmers are lost accordingly. In practice, land requisition in rural China is requisi-
tion of LURs of farmers for the purpose of urban development. Compulsory requisition 
of LURs of (both rural and urban) land is stipulated in Article 44 of the Property Law 
(2007): “for the purpose of emergency handling and disaster relief”, real and movable 
properties of institutions or individuals may be reclaimed in line with the procedure and 
within the authority provided by law. The purpose of requisition of LURs of rural land is 
different from that of the permanent acquisition of collective ownership – “for the purpose 
of the public interest”. Moreover, after zhengyong, the reclaimed properties are to be 
returned to the owner. According to Article 42 (3) of the Property Law (2007), when 
houses and other real properties owned by farmers are acquired, compensation for 
demolition and resettlement shall be paid, which is more than the compensation for the 
fi xtures on land, as which farmers’ houses were once treated. However, like the vague 
defi nition of the “public interest”, the defi nition of “emergency handling and disaster 
relief” is still at the discretion of local government. Furthermore, there are no specifi c 
provisions for compensation. Apart from the compulsory requisition of LURs, farmers 
56 The Constitution (2004), Article 10(3)
57 The LAL (2004), Article 2 (4) 
58 Zhengshou is the compulsory acquisition of collective landownership; it is related to but different 
from zhengyong, which is taking of LURs. In this paper zhengshou is translated land acquisition, and 
zhengyong is translated requisition of land use rights; land seizure is a general term that refer to both 
zhengshou and zhengyong, as well as illegal conversion of rural land to urban use. 
59 The LAL (2004), Article 47
60 See Yeh (note 53), 43. 
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are also vulnerable to the predatory behavior of local governments and cadres usually 
associated with illegal conversion of farmland to commercial and industrial projects.61 
4.3. Emerging quasi-commons in rural China
Nevertheless, farmers began to pool resources and circulate land use rights responsive 
to the needs of agricultural production and the market, although some of the initiatives 
contradict the formal, written law. In many places “recollectivization” has been the trend. 
For example, farmers at Xiaogang Village – the fi rst village that distributed LURs to 
farmers – have now recollectivized their dispersed LURs for more effi cient use and 
management of land. Farmers have transferred contractual use rights to one commer-
cial company (not set up by farmers) which specializes in agricultural production and 
management in order to achieve intensive and cooperative farming and management 
of rural land (tudi jiyue hua jingying ???????) by which farmers could gain more 
income. In the processes of recollectivization, different kinds of “quasi-commons” are 
emerging: some are promoted by farmers, and some are led by local governments or 
even commercial companies. 
One kind of “quasi-commons” was called the Nanhai model (nanhai moshi ??
??). In 1992, a farmland shareholding cooperative system (tudi gufen hezuo zhi ?
??????)62 was tested in Nanhai, a county level city of Guangdong Province.63 
Land use rights of individual farmers were collectivized by “natural” villages and then 
by the administrative village to which these villages belonged. The value of farmland 
was appraised and divided into shares. A shareholding cooperative was formed by the 
administrative village. The farmland was then rented out by the cooperative for industrial 
purposes. In this way, rural land could be used for industrial and construction purposes 
but not via land acquisition by the state. Farmers could thus enjoy the long-term profi ts 
of industrialization according to the shares they had. But one of the shortcomings of 
this model is that this kind of shareholding cooperative is controlled by administrative 
villages. Farmers could not monitor the operation of the cooperatives. Administrative 
villages, rather than farmers, enjoyed most of the profi ts. 
Another kind of quasi-commons, called the Kunshan model (kunshan moshi ??
??), emerged in the early 1990s. Kunshan is a county level city of Jiangsu Province. 
This model resembles some aspects of the Nanhai model but also registers a departure 
from it.64 In this model, the rural collectives obtained quotas of rural land for construc-
tion purposes through land reclamation, and then rural households could bid for these 
quotas. These rural households later formed cooperatives. LURs for construction pur-
poses were thus held by cooperatives of farmers rather than administrative villages. 
61 See Cai Yongshun, Collective Ownership or Cadres’ Ownership? The Non-Agricultural Use of Farm-
land in China, The China Quarterly (2003), no. 175, 662–680. 
62 On shareholding cooperatives (gufen hezuozhi ?????), see, e. g., Eduard B. Vermeer, Share-
holding Cooperatives: A Property Rights Analysis, in: Property Rights and Economic Reform in 
China, eds. Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder, 1999, 123–144. 
63 On discussion of the Nanhai model, see also Ting Xu and Tim Murphy, The City as Laboratory and 
the Urban-Rural Divide: The Revival of Private Property and its Limits in Post-Mao China, China 
Perspectives (2008), no.4, 26–34. 
64 On the comparison between the Nanhai model and the Kunshan model, see, e. g., Zhou Qiren, Non-
gdi rushi de liangzhong moshi [Two Models for Rural Land to Enter Into the Market], Jingji Guancha 
Bao [Economic Observer], 7 November 2008. In <http://fi nance.qq.com/a/20081007/002363.
htm> (last visited 30 December 2008). 
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These cooperatives then built factories and shops rented by outside investors. There 
was less government involvement in this property arrangement than that in the Nanhai 
model. In both models, the income of farmers may be more than that of urban residents. 
Further local reforms of the rural LURs focus on allowing farmers to contribute rural 
land contractual management rights as shares to enterprises or joint ventures.65 Despite 
the contradictory laws and regulations, on 1 July 2007, Chongqing allowed farmers to 
contribute LURs to joint enterprises or joint ventures as shares, provided that the use 
purpose of arable land is not changed. Yet these reforms are clearly against Articles 
60 and 63 of the Land Administration Law (LAL). 
5.  The end of the urban-rural divide? Barriers to and prospects for 
quasi-commons in rural China
The examples above have revealed that “quasi-commons” may pave the way for rural 
land to enter into the market rather than through compulsory land acquisition by the 
state. The compulsory land acquisition may deprive farmers of their land use rights 
permanently while leaving little compensation for farmers, whereas in “quasi-common” 
farmers could still keep their land use rights and use these rights in a profi table way. 
Evidently, “quasi-commons” may boost rural income and rural productivity, stimulate 
rural consumption, attract urban capital, and diminish the urban-rural divide. If “quasi-
commons” fully develops, it may bridge the urban-rural divide. However, we should 
note that “quasi-commons” emerges in a situation where there exists incomplete land 
ownership, land acquisition without fair compensation, and a lack of a social security 
system. Farmers do not have enough income from farming. In addition, in many cases, 
the involvement of local government makes the boundaries between “quasi-commons” 
and government-led projects unclear. Moreover, there have been many barriers to the 
development of “quasi-commons”. 
One barrier is an argument among Chinese academics and policy makers about 
“quasi-commons” in rural China, as well as over the direction of change in the rural 
land system.66 Some favor nationalization of rural land, and this approach is similar 
to permanent tenancy (yongdian ??), which was popular in Qing and Republican 
China. This approach supports the reclaiming of all the land by the state, and granting 
permanent land use rights to farmers by the state. The other proposal is privatization 
of rural land. 
The differing proposals also refl ect different political discourses. Currently, con-
troversies in China surrounding the revival of private property and its implications for 
what modern China is or is becoming can be grouped into two major camps. The fi rst 
is liberalism (ziyou zhuyi?????) or neo-liberalism67 (xin ziyou zhuyi ?????) 
65 The Land Contracting Law and the LAL confl ict at this point. Article 42 of the Land Contracting Law 
allows farmers to contribute rural land contractual management rights as shares; according to article 
60 of the LAL, farmers cannot contribute LURs to joint enterprises or joint ventures as investments, 
or assign LURs to township enterprises without approval from the government at or above county 
levels. 
66 On the summery of different models of land ownership reform suggested by Chinese scholars see, 
e. g., Liu Rongcai, Dangqian zhongguo nongcun tudi suoyouzhi gaige moshi yanjiu zongshu [A Lit-
erature Review of the Research on the Current Rural Land Ownership System Reform in China], 
Shangye Yanjiu [Commercial Research] 18 (2006), 149–155. 
67 This side is infl uenced by mainstream economists in the West who interpret their mission as pro-
moting “neo-classical” ideas, including those of Ronald Coase and Richard Posner. See also F. A. 
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that regards free markets, individual liberty and private property rights protected by “the 
rule of law” as the sine qua non for sustained economic growth. Neo-liberalists have 
been largely infl uenced by the writings of Ronald Coase in which “transaction costs” 
are the key to the understanding of economic institutions.68 The second is the “new 
left”69 (xin zuopai ???) who cherish “new collectivism” and warn against the dangers 
of diminishing state-ownership and encroachments upon social equality. The new left 
stresses the role of the state. Accordingly, the privatization proposal is the neoliberal 
project transforming public property into private property, while the nationalization 
proposal is a project along the lines of the new left. 
The neo-liberal project transforming public to private property is based on a society 
underpinned by trust, contract, clearly defi ned property rights and the rule of law. Chi-
nese society, however, has individual trust but lacks trust in the system. There is a lack 
of well-functioning market of circulating rural LURs, and too many government interests 
(especially those of local governments) are involved in this “market”. Moreover, some 
people worry that, without a functioning social security system, loosening the control 
over the circulation of rural LURs may make farmers transfer contractual management 
rights cheaply to big agricultural conglomerates, making another way of land seizure. 
The number of landless farmers could increase, and a new form of inequality could 
thus emerge.70 Without cooperative arrangements and the constraint of government 
power over land acquisition, privatization will be ineffective. 
The polarization between nationalization and privatization has oversimplifi ed the 
reality of the Chinese property regime. There exist variations, tensions and intricacies 
in terms of different forms of de facto ownership. At the same time, the boundaries 
between public ownership and private ownership are blurred. In contrast to the offi -
cial, and indeed legal, support for unitary and exclusive property rights, the reality of 
the property regime has seen the fragmentation of property rights. For example, local 
governments have de facto control over collectively owned rural land. The problem 
with nationalization or state ownership is: does government ownership refer to state 
(Beijing?) ownership or local government ownership? To what extent or in what sense 
can the state own, if various kinds of agencies or other users can gain access to re-
sources and have the de facto power to make decisions on how to use resources?71 
In terms of the privatization proposal along the lines of neo-liberalism, it cannot explain 
why the Chinese economy grows fast, while property rights remain vaguely defi ned 
and weakly enforced. 
The polarization between nationalization and privatization ignores the communal 
sphere in rural China. Individual rural households cannot cope with issues such as 
Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political 
Economy, 1982. For the analysis on Chinese neo-liberalists see, e. g., Wang Hui, China’s New Order: 
Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition, 2003. 
68 See, e. g., R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4(1937), no. 16, 386–405; R. H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics (Oct. 1960), 1–44. 
69 The new-left in China is an ideological tendency in opposition to capitalism that fi rst arose in the 
mid-1990s. It criticizes the problems faced by China during its modernization such as inequality and 
the widening gap between the rich and the poor. On the new-left see Wang Hui, Contemporary Chi-
nese Thought and the Question of Modernity, in: Whither China: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary 
China, ed. Zhang Xudong, 2001, 161–198; Zheng Yongnian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in 
China: Modernization and International Relations, 1999, 52–69. 
70 See, e. g., the recent increasingly scarce employment of rural migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta 
as a consequence of the global fi nancial crisis. 
71 The problems with social security provision (e. g., provision responsibilities and fi nance sources) also 
lie in the complex central-local relation. 
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environmental protection and food security that need cooperative efforts.72 In rural 
China, there is also weakness in fi nance, technology, public services, and information 
provision. In particular, the social security system does not keep in pace with other 
aspects of rural reform. The fl aw of the household responsibility system is that it just 
grants farmers the tenure of small landholdings similar to what farmers had in the pre-
1958 era, but overlooks the difference between subsistence farming and farming for 
the market in the post-1978 period, as well as between ordinary farming activity and 
collective or pooled-labor activities. Farming for the market needs markets and coop-
erative working; pooled-labor activities need cooperation between farmers as well. For 
example, in the village I visited in Henan province in June 2007, there was reciprocity 
among villagers over time in relation to pooled labor. Household A helped household 
B last year, household B should help household A this year.73 Some problems with the 
lack of technology and information may be overcome by pooling resource together. 
Thus, it is worthwhile to explore the implications of “the commons” for the Chinese 
rural land regime. Common property and private property are not polar opposites; they 
are mutually constitutive rather than mutually exclusive, and there are many theoretical 
discourses to support this argument. Flessas notes that from the original grant of the 
world, use and appropriation are the logical steps in order to make the things of nature 
benefi cial to humanity, “the concept of appropriation and legitimating the taking of re-
sources is also part of the discourse of the commons”.74 For “common-pool resource”, 
Ostrom argues that “it is essential to distinguish between the resource system and the 
fl ow of resource units produced by the system, while still recognizing the dependence 
of the one on the other”.75 “Resource units are what individuals appropriate or use from 
resource systems”.76 Therefore, theoretically, private property and common property 
could coexist. 
Many empirical case studies have corroborated the theoretical premises of the co-
existence between private property and common property,77 including some examples 
of “quasi-commons” as noted in this paper: mutual aid teams set up in 1953 are a typical 
example of the side-by-side existence between private property and common property. 
Yet it is insuffi cient to look at the commons just through an economic lens. The Chinese 
reality is not only far more complex than the above theoretical premises, but also dif-
ferent from the empirical cases in other countries, due to its peculiar socio-economic 
conditions, and legal and governmental institutions. The diffi culties with the formation 
and operation of “the commons” include “identifi cation”, “controlling” and “monitoring”. 
For example, how to hold farmers together? And to what extent should the government 
be involved in “the commons”? 
The economic reform commenced in 1978 is “groping for stones to cross the river”, 
as Deng Xiaoping called it. This metaphor indicates that economic reform is directed 
by the ongoing facts without clear guidelines or legal rules, or else that guidelines and 
legal rules often lag behind the pace of economic reform. Moreover, China’s economic 
reform is not just a “planned and top-down” project directed by Deng Xiaoping, who is 
72 See, e. g., the recent food security scandals such as contaminated milk powder in China. 
73 But unlike mutual aid teams in the 1950s, this reciprocity does involve cash payment. On this also 
see, e. g., Scott Wilson, The Cash Nexus and Social Networks: Mutual Aid and Gifts in Contemporary 
Shanghai Villages, The China Journal (1997), no. 37, 91–112. 
74 See Tatiana Flessas, The Repatriation Debate and the Discourse of the Commons, Social & Legal 
Studies 17(2008), no.3, 387–405. 
75 Ostrom (note 13), 30. Italics are in the original. 
76 ibid. 
77 See, e. g., Ostrom (note 13). 
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often regarded as the chief designer of market reform. Similarly, Beijing did not and is 
not able to conceive a unifi ed and comprehensive plan that oversees every process 
and aspect of economic reform. The reality has been far more complex and intricate.78 
In fact, many initiatives that have propelled the reforms are from the grassroots. 
Yet, as opposed to the power of elites that push for economic and legal reforms, the 
other source of power that is also of importance for reforms – the grassroots initiatives 
(either individual or communal) – is often ignored. These grassroots initiatives always 
run into obstacles to get recognition in the law; in many cases, these initiatives even 
get suppressed. Grassroots organizations are also weak. 
Many villages now have direct and competitive elections, a form of direct democracy 
(zhijie minzhu????) at the grassroots as a supplement to the indirect democracy 
(jianjie minzhu?????) of the People’s Congress at the higher levels.79 However, 
under the dual authority of Party and government, the Party secretary of the village 
is still appointed by the higher-level authority of the CCP. The fi fth plenum of the 16th 
CCP Central Committee, which ended on 11 October 2005, put forward “Construct-
ing the New Socialist Countryside” (jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun???????
???) as the foremost task facing China in the 2006–2010 fi ve year period, aiming 
to reduce the urban-rural disparity, illegal confi scation of rural land for development 
projects, unauthorized conversion of agricultural land to industrial projects and so 
on.80 Agricultural tax was also abolished in 2006. However, rather than encouraging 
self-governance of farmers, “Building the New Socialist Countryside” is a strong state 
intervention into countryside construction infl uenced by new-left ideas. 
In terms of grassroots organizations and property management in rural China, Ar-
ticle 10 of the LAL and Article 60 of the Property Law provide that collectively owned 
land shall be managed and administered by the village collective economic organiza-
tion81 (jiti jingji zuzhi ??????) or the villagers’ committee (cunmin weiyuanhui
?????), but villages’ groups, the rural self-governing organizations at the basic 
level, do not hold much power. This situation has been shaped by the transformation 
of reorganizing rural China in the post-1978 era. In the early 1980s, when the com-
munes were dismantled, the production teams at the lowest level of the communes 
diminished fastest. After the township (xiangzhen ??) replaced the commune, the 
administrative village (xingzheng cun ???) took the place of the production brigade, 
and the villagers’ group (cunmin xiaozu ????) superseded the production team,82 
the villagers’ group was weak while power was diverted to the administrative village level 
and the township level. This kind of arrangement of collective ownership has entered 
into a paradoxical situation: although the de jure owner of rural land is the collective, 
the de facto owners are multiple. Although the role of government should be limited to 
public service such as social security and information provision, in “quasi-commons” 
emerging in rural China, there is often too much involvement of local governments. 
78 See also James Kynge, China Shakes the World: A Titan’s Rise and Troubled Future and the Chal-
lenge for America, 2006, 12–14. 
79 See Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese 
Villages, The China Quarterly (2000), no. 162, 515. 
80 See, e. g., Richard McGregor, China Launches “New Deal” for Farmers, Financial Times, 22 February 
2006. In <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/74029202-a389-11da-83cc-0000779e2340.html.> (last 
visited 29 April 2007). 
81 “The village collective economic organization” is not clearly defi ned in law. 
82 See Peter Ho, Who Owns China’s Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambi-
guity, The China Quarterly (2001), no. 166, 405. 
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Given the features of economic reform and legal reform in China, the private, infor-
mal power from the grassroots has always been the bearer of the risks generated by 
the reforms. The power from the grassroots breaks through the old planned system, 
but in the meantime it disobeys the law; or it obeys the law, but does not conform to 
policy. Power from the grassroots lingers in the gray area between “the legal” and “the 
illegal”. Moreover, under the “quasi-federal” structure of government, whether an in-
formal institution is successful or gets legalized is largely due to the attitudes of local 
governments, which can play roles in either facilitating or obstructing the emergence 
of informal or grassroots institutions.83 
6. Conclusion
Apart from examining the top-down projects aiming to bridge the urban-rural divide 
(for example, abolishing the household registration system), it is worth exploring the 
grassroots initiatives. “Quasi-commons” in rural China, as grassroots initiatives of 
farmers, may boost farmers’ income, promote self-governance of farmers, and bridge 
the urban-rural divide. Some kinds of emerging “quasi-commons” in rural China have 
been recognized and encouraged by recent Party policy. The third Plenum of the 17th 
CCP Central Committee (hereinafter the Plenum) held on 9–12 October 2008 has set 
a new round of rural reforms in motion, and has brought new changes to rural land use 
rights. There are several important aims in the decision (jueding??)84 of the Plenum 
published on 19 Oct 2008 (hereinafter the decision). First, it confi rms that contractual 
management rights of rural land will remain unchanged and stable for a long period 
(baochi wending bing changjiu bubian?????????). The decision also permits 
various means of contractual management rights circulation (tudi chengbao jingy-
ingquan liuzhuan?????????), including subcontracting (zhuangbao???), 
leasing (chuzu???), exchanging (huhuan???), transferring (zhuanrang???) and 
shareholding cooperatives (gufen hezuo?????).85 
Yet there are many barriers to the development of quasi-commons. Among the 
barriers, the fl aws in the existing land system are paramount. In particular, since 1978, 
private property has been selectively granted to farmers through dismantling rural 
communes and the introduction of the household responsibility system. However, rural 
land is still owned by collectives rather than farmers, and farmers only enjoy limited 
land use rights. Collective ownership remains a constraint for farmers to fully engage 
in and enjoy benefi ts from marketization. Moreover, while Beijing may be “seeing like 
a state”,86 local governments have the ability to mobilize resources and are pursuing 
their own interests. The lack of self-governance by farmers and the lack of communal 
83 A typical example of the success in individual cooperative housing construction was in Wenzhou, 
Zhejiang Province, because of the strong business associations, suffi cient local fi nance and support 
from the local government in Wenzhou. 
84 Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu tuijin nongcun gaige fazhan ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding [The 
Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Crucial Issues Regarding Rural Reform and 
Development???????????????????????], available in <http://politics.
people.com.cn/GB/1026/8194064.html > (last visited 19 October 2008). 
85 Article 32 of Land Contracting Law (2002) already provides that “contractual management rights 
obtained through household contract may, according to law, be circulated by subcontracting, leasing, 
exchanging and transferring or other means”. 
86 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed, 1998
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governance of resources still hinder the formation of “the commons” in rural China. 
Whether or not “quasi-commons” could create new socio-economic spaces and even 
new social organizations would be the subject of a future paper.87 
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